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How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership to Contain China in International Trade 
Daniel C.K. Chow 
Abstract 
 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was signed on February 5, 2016 by its twelve 
members and is now open for ratification. If ratified, the TPP will be the largest mega free trade 
area in history and will encompass forty percent of world trade. The U.S. led the TPP negotiations 
and deliberately excluded China from the negotiations. This ploy by the U.S. was a calculated 
effort to contain China and to shift power in trade in the Asia-Pacific from China to the U.S. 
China now appears to face a difficult choice. China can join the already concluded TPP, with its 
text largely drafted by the U.S., and submit to terms it had no part in negotiating and to a 
humiliating process of seeking approval from the U.S. Joining the TPP means accepting a treaty 
in which every major provision is directed at China in an attempt to contain China’s ascendancy 
in international trade. The other alternative is to ignore the TPP, but this could mean significant 
losses in trade opportunities right in China’s own neighborhood. The battle over the TPP is a 
major contest between the two countries to determine which will write the rules of international 
trade for the twenty-first century. On the one hand, the U.S. is determined to write the rules, 
which will have as their chief aim to contain China. On the other hand, China seeks to write the 
rules in a way that will benefit China at the expense of the U.S. This Article examines how the 
TPP is designed specifically to contain China and how China might respond to this challenge 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The U.S. achieved an important strategic objective in its efforts to contain 
the People’s Republic of China (China) in global trade when the historic Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) was signed on February 5, 2016.1 The negotiations 
leading to the TPP have been called the most significant since the Uruguay Round 
of negotiations that led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).2 Now open for ratification,3 the TPP is a vast free trade agreement 
covering the Asia-Pacific region and encompassing forty percent of world trade.4 
The TPP promises “WTO plus” treatment—that is, trade privileges more 
favorable than those available under the World Trade Organization for all of TPP 
members, but not available for non-members, such as China.5 The TPP now 
stands ready for ratification by its twelve members: Australia, Brunei, Canada, 
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the U.S., and 
Vietnam, with other countries, such as South Korea, expressing interest in 
joining.6 If the TPP gets ratified and becomes legally binding,7 it will be an 
unprecedented mega free trade agreement and could permanently change the 
course of international trade in Asia by shifting power to the U.S. and away from 
China.8 This possible shift can be seen in the glaring exclusion in the list of TPP 
members: China—the world’s second largest economy located right in the heart 
of the territory of the TPP—was not invited to join in the TPP negotiations or to 
sign the agreement.9 
China’s exclusion from the TPP negotiations was no accident, but instead 
was a deliberate ploy by the U.S. to limit China’s growing global trade influence 
                                                 
1  See Catherine Putz, TPP: The Ratification Race is On, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 5, 2016), 
http://perma.cc/VRU5-ZC7U; see also Michal Meidan, The TPP and China: The Elephant That Wasn’t 
in the Room, THE DIPLOMAT (Oct. 15, 2015), http://perma.cc/P5TE-4G6N. For the full text of the 
TPP, see TPP Full Text, Office of the United States Trade Representative, https://perma.cc/77GY-
EY5E (last visited Oct. 4, 2016). 
2  See TPP Full Text, supra note 1. 
3  See id. at art. 30(5); see also Rebecca Howard, Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal signed, but years of 
negotiations still to come, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://perma.cc/5DDA-2Z5B. 
4  See Howard, supra note 3. 
5  See infra Section II. 
6  See supra note 1. 
7  The TPP comes into force once it is ratified. See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(5). 
8  See infra Section IV. 
9  See id. By the time China could have joined in the negotiations, the major provisions of the text 
affecting China had been completed. New members must accept the text as is and cannot revisit 
any text that has been completed. Any new member  can only participate in negotiations on new 
text. 
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starting right in China’s own backyard.10 The U.S. did not want China’s input on 
the terms of the TPP as is; rather, the U.S. wanted to dictate the terms of the TPP 
on its own, with the cooperation of the other compliant TPP members.11 Now 
that the negotiations over the TPP text have been formally concluded and the 
ratification process has begun, China can join the TPP, but only under conditions 
imposed by the U.S. in the text of the TPP.12 China will be allowed to join only by 
accepting all of the terms of the TPP as is, and is without any power to alter, 
propose revisions, or dilute any of its provisions unless approved by all the TPP 
countries, including the U.S.13 Moreover, in order to join the TPP, China might 
have to undergo a humiliating process of submitting its terms of admission, 
essentially an application, to the U.S. Congress for review and approval,14 a process 
that could take several years and could expose China to many additional demands 
by Congress that China must accept as conditions of joining the TPP. Congress 
might also relish the opportunity to use the approval process to scold and 
embarrass China in its conduct of international trade.15 
                                                 
10  See infra Section IV. 
11  See id. 
12  Since the text of the U.S.-led TPP is final and agreed to by the signature of the TPP parties on Feb. 
5, 2016, the only way to change the text is to amend it. Amendments require the consent of all 
members, including the U.S. See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(2) (describing amendments as requiring 
the consent of all members). 
13  See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(2). 
14  See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(4) (describing the accession process as requiring the approval of 
each TPP member including the U.S. in accordance with applicable legal procedures of each 
member). If Congress approves the TPP, Congress will also issue a regulation on the approval 
procedures for new members of the TPP; Congress issued a similar regulation for new WTO 
members when it approved and implemented the WTO agreements in the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 1-3-465, 108 Stat. 4829 (1994) codified as 19 U.S.C. § 3532 
[hereinafter URAA]. Article I, § 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate 
commerce with foreign nations,” giving Congress the final say on U.S. trade law and policy. 
Congress could enact legislation requiring congressional approval of all new TPP members, but it 
is more likely that Congress will follow the model of the URAA. With respect to new members of 
the WTO, the URAA requires that “the [United States] Trade Representative . . . consult with the 
appropriate congressional committees before any vote is taken by the Ministerial Conference [of 
the WTO] . . . relating to . . . the accession of a state.” Implementation of Uruguay Round 
Agreements, 19 U.S.C.A. § 3532 (1994). If Congress enacts a similar provision related to new 
members of the TPP, which seems likely, Congress could hold public hearings on China’s accession 
to the TPP. 
15  Congress might criticize China for “cheating” in international trade as there is a commonly held 
view that China ignores the rules of the WTO. See David Pilling, It won’t be easy to build an ‘anyone but 
China’ club, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (May 22, 2013), http://perma.cc/MP89-AFMB. Prior to China’s 
ascension to the WTO, the U.S. Congress held hearings every year to determine whether to extend 
trade benefits to China under the Most-Favored Nation Principle, which would allow China to 
enjoy lower tariffs on its imports into the U.S. The U.S. used the annual review process as an 
opportunity to make threats and lecture China on its deficiencies in its human rights record. See 
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Creating an “anyone but China club”16 was an express and aggressive 
objective of the U.S. in establishing the TPP. Although China was never a party 
to the TPP negotiations, China played a key role in the positions advocated by the 
U.S. In the words of one observer, “China is the ultimate target of every major 
U.S. proposal in the [TPP, a] ‘new generation twenty-first-century agreement.’”17 
One of the motives behind the TPP is to force China into accepting obligations 
that exceed those of the WTO.18 Many politicians, trade unions, and businesses 
believe that China was able to reap the advantages of its WTO membership while 
paying little in return.19 In exchange for the benefits of obtaining greater access to 
foreign markets, WTO members are required to reduce trade barriers in order to 
open up their own markets to other WTO members.20 After it joined the WTO, 
however, China allowed many of its trade barriers to persist by ignoring many of 
the rules of the WTO.21 For example, China gained trade advantages by continuing 
to subsidize its massive state-owned enterprises and by ignoring intellectual 
property rules.22 In other words, some critics regard China as a free-rider of the 
WTO, reaping the benefits of the WTO while not playing fair through 
contributing in kind by following the rules of international trade.23 The TPP can 
help to rein in China’s behavior by imposing rules that exceed WTO obligations, 
backed by the TPP’s own dispute resolution process that will have the bite of trade 
sanctions for refusing to comply with TPP obligations.24 The TPP itself is 
compatible with the WTO, which means that TPP countries continue to be bound 
                                                 
Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Opposes Human Rights in the World Trade Organization, 35 U. PENN. J. 
INT’L L. 61, 77–80 (2013). China found this process to be humiliating and the common perception 
at the time was that these annual reviews were an opportunity for China “bashing.” See id. at 79–80 
& n.91. 
16  See Pilling, supra note 15. 
17  See Jane Kelsey, U.S. China Relations and the Geopolitics of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, GLOBAL 
RESEARCH (Nov. 11, 2013), http://perma.cc/D4EJ-PU4W; see also Nathan Vanderklippe, TPP deal 
a way for U.S. to reassert primacy over China, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Oct. 5, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/L6LM-WXJJ. 
18  China joined the WTO in 2001. See Member Information: China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, http://perma.cc/R34K-6RUU (last visited Oct. 9, 2016). 
19  See Pilling, supra note 15. 
20  See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, 
CASES, AND MATERIALS 26 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW]. 
21  See Pilling, supra note 15. 
22  See id. 
23  See id. 
24  See infra Section II.A. 
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by the WTO25 and that the TPP cannot be challenged by China under the WTO 
as discriminatory or otherwise unlawful.26 
Reining in or constraining China in international trade is achieved by the 
TPP through a number of specific trade provisions; the major provisions are the 
subjects of study in this Article. For the U.S. government, these various provisions 
of the TPP serve three important objectives, set forth below, which both threaten 
and constrain China. These three features of the TPP seem to put China in a 
difficult conundrum—China can suffer losses in international trade by refusing to 
join the TPP, or it can join the TPP and be subject to the humiliation of having 
to abide by rules written by the U.S. with the express intent of containing China. 
First, the threat to China if they refuse to join the TPP is a loss of trade with 
the U.S. and other TPP members.27 From an economic perspective, the TPP, like 
all preferential trade agreements (PTAs), is a double-edged sword in that it both 
creates and diverts trade.28 PTAs increase trade among their members because 
intra-PTA trade faces fewer trade barriers.29 For example, in the trade of goods, 
PTA members are allowed to offer “WTO plus” treatment, such as lower tariffs 
than the WTO rate (and ultimately zero tariffs) for goods traded from other PTA 
members.30 This helps to increase the trade in goods among PTA members, as 
imports are less expensive, since, they come in at lower tariffs or even duty free,31 
than imports from China, which are subject to the regular WTO rate from TPP 
members.32 Assuming that the quality of the imports is the same or similar, 
importers from PTA members would prefer to buy goods from other PTA 
members as opposed to non-PTA members because goods from PTA members 
are less expensive.33 Therefore, if China does not join the TPP, China might suffer 
losses in its trade with the U.S. as well as other TPP members.34 This could lead 
to the reduction of the record $365.7 billion trade deficit that the U.S. has with 
                                                 
25  See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 1(2) (noting that the TPP is to “coexist with their existing international 
agreements . . . including the WTO agreement.”). 
26  The TPP is authorized by Article XXIV:5 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which 
permits WTO members to form free trade agreements such as the TPP. For a more detailed 
explanation of this point, see infra Section II.A. 
27  See infra Section II.B. 
28  See id. 
29  See id. 
30  See id. 
31  See id. 
32  See id. 
33  See id. 
34  See id. 
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China as of 2015.35 The ever-expanding U.S. trade deficit with China has proven 
to be an incendiary and bitter political and business issue in the U.S.,36 fueled by 
beliefs that China is cheating in international trade.37 The TPP could help to 
address these grievances by diverting trade away from China and directing trade 
toward other countries, such as Australia, that enjoy more friendly relations with 
the U.S. 
Second, if China does join the TPP, China will be constrained because the 
TPP will erode many of the trade advantages that China now enjoys and is able to 
exploit under the WTO.38 For example, according to many critics, China does not 
enforce laws relating to workers’ rights.39 China has allowed its workers to toil 
long hours in unsanitary and dangerous working conditions with few rights to 
demand any changes.40 Although China has high-level labor laws dealing with all 
of these issues, China does not enforce them, thus allowing labor abuses to 
continue without any consequences.41 Aside from the social issues of human 
rights, the non-enforcement of labor laws reduces the costs to the employer of 
labor in manufacturing. Low labor costs allow China to charge lower prices for its 
goods that are exported to the U.S. The TPP will impose higher labor standards 
on China, increasing the protection for China’s workers and at the same time 
increasing the prices of its goods.42 The TPP also creates a dispute settlement 
mechanism that other TPP members can use to compel China to either enforce 
these obligations or face sanctions under the TPP.43 
Similarly, China does not enforce environmental standards in producing its 
goods, leading to not only the degradation of the environment, but more 
importantly in the context of trade, to lower-priced goods.44 Refusing to follow 
high-level environmental standards and continuing to use “dirty fuel,” such as 
coal-fired power plants, that pollute the environment, is a serious social issue. 
From a trade perspective, dirty fuel is a cheaper way to produce goods that can 
                                                 
35  See Kimberly Amadeo, Why Is The U.S./China Trade Deficit So High?, THE BALANCE (Sept. 8, 2016), 
http://perma.cc/3RN8-7HMH. 
36  See infra Section II.C. 
37  See, for example, Daniel Mills, China Cheats While the U.S. Suffers, ECONOMY IN CRISIS (May 25, 2014), 
http://perma.cc/RKQ3-U7AU. 
38  See infra Section III. 
39  See infra Section III.A. 
40  See id. 
41  See id. 
42  See id. 
43  See infra Section III.A. 
44  See infra Section III.B. 
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out-compete U.S. produced goods based on price.45 The U.S. uses 
environmentally sustainable sources of power to manufacture goods.46 Of course, 
using environmentally sustainable power involves the use of expensive 
technologies that result in higher costs that are passed onto the consumer of 
products in the form of high prices. China can charge lower prices because it does 
not use more expensive forms of production that are friendly to the environment. 
The TPP would impose environmental obligations on China that would force 
China to use manufacturing processes that are more environmentally friendly and 
expensive. China would need to raise prices for its goods and this obligation would 
help to even the playing field between the U.S. and China. 
Other measures that China currently maintains are financial and regulatory 
support of China’s massive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that benefit from 
myriad forms of state assistance and from discrimination against foreign 
companies located in China.47 These SOEs are thus able to lower the cost of their 
goods or services that are provided in China and abroad and out-compete foreign 
companies located in China due to favoritism from the Chinese government.48 
The TPP is designed to neutralize the advantages that China enjoys from its 
treatment of SOEs.49 
Third, the TPP is a shot aimed squarely—by the U.S.—at China that lets 
China know in no uncertain terms that the U.S., not China, intends to write the 
rules of international trade for Asia and the rest of the world in the twenty-first 
century.50 The U.S., with a few of its close allies in Europe and Japan, has 
essentially written the rules of international trade for the past seventy years since 
the end of the Second World War.51 Recently, however, this paradigm has come 
under siege from China. In the past decade, China has entered into many free 
trade agreements that differ in fundamental ways from the U.S.-led rules of 
international trade.52 In contrast with U.S. trade agreements, China’s free trade 
agreements have no meaningful provisions concerning workers’ rights, the 
environment, or SOEs.53 Earlier this year, China established the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with a set of rules for international 
                                                 
45  See id. 
46  See id. 
47  See infra Section III.C. 
48  See id. 
49  See id. 
50  See infra Section IV.  
51  See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, 49 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2016). 
52  See infra Section IV. 
53  See id. 
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financing that directly challenges the U.S.-dominated World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund that have controlled international lending for the 
past seventy years.54 The AIIB is a direct challenge to the U.S. in setting investment 
rules in Asia and other countries.55 The TPP is the U.S.’s latest volley in the 
growing rivalry between the U.S. and China on who will write the rules of 
international trade for the twenty-first century.56 How China responds to the 
threat and challenge of the TPP is an important development in this growing 
rivalry between the two largest economies in the world. 
This Article will develop the themes set forth above by proceeding in three 
sections. Section II will discuss the nature of preferential trade agreements and 
their relationship to the WTO, and detail how PTAs both create and divert trade 
and the threat this poses to China if China refuses to join the TPP. Section III of 
this Article will examine how joining the TPP will neutralize key advantages China 
currently enjoys in international trade, including concerns related to workers’ 
rights, the environment, and state-owned enterprises. Section IV will discuss how 
the U.S. and China are locked in a fierce battle on who will write the rules for 
international trade in the twenty-first century and how the TPP appears to be a 
major victory for the U.S., assuming that the TPP is ratified by the U.S. Congress,57 
in this ongoing battle. Section V then concludes with some observations about 
future developments, including how China might respond to the TPP. 
II.  THE WTO,  PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ,  AND 
THE  TPP 
The TPP is a comprehensive PTA that not only liberalizes the trade in 
goods,58 but also includes trade in services,59 financial services,60 
                                                 
54  See supra note 51. 
55  See id. 
56  See id. 
57  Factors influencing whether the U.S. Congress will approve the TPP are whether (1) President-
Elect Donald Trump will reverse his campaign position opposing the TPP; (2) Trump will 
renegotiate the TPP and seek Congressional approval of a modified TPP; and (3) the next election 
cycle in 2020 will result in a new President who supports the TPP. In the author’s view, it is possible 
that President-Elect Trump will reverse candidate Trump’s opposition to the current or modified 
version of the TPP because the TPP is designed to increase U.S. export trade opportunities, increase 
employment, and reign in China’s aggressive trade tactics, a favorite subject of criticism during 
President-Elect Trump’s campaign. 
58  See TPP, supra note 1, at ch. 2 (National Treatment and Market Access). 
59  See id. at ch. 10 (Trade in Services). 
60  See id. at ch. 11 (Financial Services). 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Chow 
Winter 2017 379 
telecommunications,61 foreign direct investment,62 government transparency and 
anti-corruption,63 coherence in government regulation,64 and technology transfer 
(intellectual property).65 The TPP also has an effective dispute settlement system, 
modeled after that of the WTO, that is generally regarded as a great success in 
enforcing WTO obligations.66 Similar to the WTO, the TPP’s dispute settlement 
system can authorize trade sanctions to enforce TPP obligations, which makes the 
TPP’s enforcement mechanism one of its key features.67 
In order to facilitate an understanding of how the TPP—or any preferential 
trade agreement—works, the following discussion will focus on the trade in goods 
because it is still the most fundamental and important channel of trade, far 
exceeding all other channels of trade (services, investment, and intellectual 
property) in monetary terms.68 In addition, understanding how PTAs liberalize the 
trade in goods will also help in understanding how the PTA liberalizes trade in 
services, investment, and technology (intellectual property) as the same basic 
principles apply (with some variations) in all these channels. This discussion also 
explains the relationship between the TPP and the WTO, and why the WTO both 
permits and encourages preferential trade agreements like the TPP. 
A.  The WTO, the Most-Favored-Nation Principle, and 
Preferential Trade Areas  
The twelve countries that are members of the TPP are also members of the 
WTO and are subject to the obligations of both organizations.69  Established in 
1995,70 the WTO remains the landmark and fundamental multilateral treaty that 
                                                 
61  See id. at ch. 13 (Telecommunications). 
62  See id. at ch. 9 (Investment). 
63  See id. at ch. 26 (Transparency and Anti-Corruption) 
64  See id. at ch. 25 (Regulatory Coherence). 
65  See id. at ch. 18 (Intellectual Property). 
66  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 63. 
67  See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 3–4, 6. The technical term used by the TPP for trade sanctions is the 
“suspension of benefits.” For example, suppose that Country A, a TPP member, has agreed to zero 
tariffs for goods from Country B. If Country B fails to comply with the TPP, the TPP can authorize 
Country A to suspend its zero tariffs for goods from Country B, which would then likely be subject 
to higher tariffs under Country A’s GATT rate. Country B would suffer a loss in trade due to the 
higher tariffs. This is what constitutes a trade sanction under the TPP and the WTO. 
68  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 9, 14–15 (comparing 
recent figures for trade in goods, services, investment and technology). 
69  See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 1(2) (recognizing that the TPP agreement “co-exists” with the WTO 
agreements).  
70  See What is the WTO?, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/E3SA-W3LN, (last visited Oct. 
5, 2016). 
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governs most international trade in the world today.71 Trade in goods among 
WTO member nations (currently consisting of 164 nations, including all TPP 
countries) is governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).72 The GATT is one of the three major WTO agreements covering 
world trade. The other major agreements are the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS),73 which covers services trade, and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),74 which covers trade in technology 
or intellectual property. 
Of these agreements, the GATT has the longest and most venerable 
history, beginning in 1947, immediately following the Second World War.75 Prior 
to the GATT’s promulgation in 1947, no international discipline existed to curb 
the power of countries to impose tariffs on imports at the border.76 This meant 
that countries could impose tariffs at any level they pleased without violating any 
international legal obligations.77 In the period prior to the Second World War, 
many countries imposed draconian tariffs as protectionist and nationalistic 
sentiments ran high.78 In 1930, the U.S. enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act79, 
which imposed tariffs that averaged over fifty-three percent of the value of the 
products imported into the U.S.80 Other countries also passed similarly 
draconian tariffs.81 The purpose of these prohibitively high tariffs was to prevent 
trade.82 Nations refused to trade and viewed each other with mistrust and 
hostility.83 The protectionist and nationalist sentiments that swept the globe in 
                                                 
71  The WTO website indicates that the WTO currently has 164 members, including all of the most 
powerful economies in the world. See Members and Observers, World Trade Organization, 
http://perma.cc/T848-KV64, (last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
72  See GATT and the Goods Council, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/5ZNW-FHYY, (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
73  See General Agreement on Trade in Services, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/NX48-LTJP, 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
74  See TRIPS [trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights] material on the WTO website, 
World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/AK4M-CGFL, (last visited Oct. 5, 2016). 
75  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 26. 
76  See id. (describing how the GATT limits the use of tariffs as a trade barrier). Prior to the GATT no 
such mechanism existed to limit the use of tariffs. This meant that if a nation raised its tariffs other 
nations could raise theirs in a tit-for-tat response. 
77  See id. 
78  See id. at 18. 
79  Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202–1683 (1930). 
80  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 18. 
81  See id. 
82  See id. 
83  See id. 
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the 1930s contributed to the eruption of the Second World War that inflicted 
catastrophe upon the world.84 One lesson from the Second World War is that 
nations in economic conflict often fall into military conflict.85 
The GATT (1947) was intended to impose much-needed discipline on the 
use of tariffs in order to avoid the disastrous use of tariffs to create barriers to 
trade that engendered suspicion and hostility.86 Under GATT Article II1(b), each 
nation, after negotiating and reaching agreement with all other GATT (and now 
WTO) members, will establish a GATT schedule, that is, a schedule for all tariffs 
that a GATT/WTO member will impose on imports from all other 
GATT/WTO countries.87 Each nation’s tariff schedule is filed with the WTO 
and is attached to the GATT as an annex.88 Under GATT Article II, each nation 
has an obligation to impose tariffs no higher than the tariffs in its GATT 
schedule.89 In other words, the nation’s tariffs are “bound,” that is, subject to a 
ceiling created in its GATT schedule.90 A nation that imposes a tariff that 
exceeds its GATT schedule is in violation of Article II of the GATT/WTO and 
will have to withdraw the tariff or face consequences under the WTO dispute 
settlement process, 91 which has proven to be an effective dispute resolution 
mechanism.92 After the initial tariff schedules were established as a result of 
                                                 
84  See id. 
85  See id. 
86  See id. at 26. 
87  See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. II(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
88  See id. 
89  See id. 
90  See id. at art II:1(a). If a tariff is “unbound” then a WTO member can impose any tariff at any level 
it sees fit. 
91  Imposing a tariff duty that is above the bound rate is a violation of Article II:1(a)–(b). See Appellate 
Body Report, Argentina–Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, ¶ 46–
55, WTO Doc. WT/DS56/AB/R (adopted on Apr. 22, 1998). There, the Appellate Body held: 
A tariff binding in a Member’s Schedule provides an upper limit on the amount 
of duty that may be imposed . . . The principal obligation in the first sentence 
of Article II:1(b) . . . requires a Member to refrain from  imposing ordinary 
customs duties in excess of those provided for in the Member’s Schedule. . . . 
We conclude that the application of a type of duty different from the type 
provided for in a Member’s Schedule is inconsistent with Article II:1(b) . . . In 
this case, we find that Argentina has acted inconsistently with its obligations 
under Article II:1(b), first sentence, of the GATT 1994. 
 Id. 
92  WTO disputes are resolved by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which consists of panels 
that operate as trial courts, and an appellate body that functions as a high court of international 
trade. Decisions by the panels and the appellate body create institutional pressure on WTO 
members to correct any WTO violations; the WTO DSB can also authorize the imposition of trade 
sanctions against a recalcitrant offending member that creates additional pressures to comply. See 
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GATT (1947), GATT nations then engaged in successive rounds of negotiations 
to further reduce tariffs in order to facilitate international trade.93 The result of 
these negotiations has been an outstanding success.94 Tariffs have been reduced 
significantly from the pre-GATT era as a result of the promulgation of the 
GATT and subsequent rounds of negotiations.95 
Due to common political and economic interests, some nations have 
sought to reduce tariffs even further than their GATT commitments.96 Some 
nations, such as the U.S., wish to have free trade, that is, zero tariffs, on imports 
from important allies in order to reward friendly nations and to deepen existing 
political ties.97 The issue that arises with such free trade arrangements is the 
limits imposed by Article I of the GATT98, the most-favored-nation (MFN) 
principle, a bedrock and sacred pillar of international trade. Article I(1) of the 
GATT reads in relevant part: 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation . . . any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product . . . shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in . . . the 
territories of all other contracting parties.99 
The goal of the MFN principle is to ensure that members do not offer special 
preferences to some countries while denying the same benefits to other WTO 
members.100 In this sense, the MFN principle is really a principle of non-
                                                 
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 63–68. Overall, the WTO 
dispute settlement system is viewed as a great success. See id. at 63. 
93  See id. at 49–51, 180. 
94  See id. at 180. 
95  See id. 
96  See id. at 51. 
97  For example, under the North American Free Trade Agreement, the three member countries (the 
U.S., Canada, and Mexico) have agreed to zero tariffs for virtually all goods traded among them. See 
id. at 51, 56. 
98  See GATT, supra note 87, at art. I. 
99  The entire text of GATT Article I:1 reads: 
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international 
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of 
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in 
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters 
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege 
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories 
of all other contracting parties. 
 Id. at art. I:1. 
100  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 129. 
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discrimination, as opposed to a principle of favoritism as the name might 
suggest.101  A WTO member must extend equal treatment to all other WTO 
members and cannot discriminate in favor of, or against, any other WTO 
member.102 In the context of tariffs, the gist of the MFN principle is that any 
GATT/WTO member that offers tariff preferences, including zero tariffs, to any 
other GATT/WTO member must immediately and unconditionally offer the 
same tariff preferences to every other WTO member.103 Under the MFN principle, 
it becomes impossible to have a preferential trade agreement such as the TPP. 
The whole point of the TPP is that TPP members receive preferential treatment 
that is not available to non-TPP members. Under the MFN principle, such 
preferential treatment is discriminatory and a violation; a nation that extends zero 
tariffs to goods from another nation must immediately and unconditionally extend 
zero tariffs to all other WTO members.104 How, then, is it possible to have 
preferential trade agreements such as the TPP under the WTO? 
The answer lies in GATT Article XXIV: 
4. The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of 
trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer 
integration between the economies of the countries parties to such 
agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a 
free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent 
territories . . . . 
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as 
between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs 
union or of a free-trade area . . .105 
The key language of Article XXIV is the first sentence of Article XXIV(5): 
“[T]he provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent . . . the formation of a customs 
union or a free trade area.”106 This language has been read to create an exception 
                                                 
101  See id. 
102  See id. 
103  See id. at 130. 
104  See id. 
105  See GATT, supra note 87, at art. XXIV:4-5.   
106  A free trade area, such as NAFTA, allows for the free movement of goods within the members of 
the free trade area, but subject goods from non-members of the free trade area to the individual 
tariffs of each of the members. In the case of NAFTA, goods from the U.S. travel to Mexico and 
Canada duty free, but goods from a non-NAFTA member are subject to the individual tariff rates 
of each NAFTA member. For instance, goods from China that enter Canada would be subject to 
Canadian tariffs, that enter the U.S. would be subject to U.S. tariffs, that enter Mexico would be 
subject to Mexican tariffs. These tariffs might vary from nation to nation so that the importer might 
pay a higher tariff in the U.S. than an importer might pay in Mexico. Free trade areas thus encourage 
forum shopping for the cheapest tariff rate among the members of the free trade area from which 
the goods can then move around the free trade area duty free. This is why NAFTA has complex 
rules of origin that are designed to eliminate this type of forum shopping. So under the NAFTA 
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to the other provisions of the GATT, including the MFN principle in GATT 
Article I. The result is that under a free trade agreement or a customs union, the 
MFN principle does not apply because, if it did, it would prevent the formation 
of a free trade area in contravention of the express language of GATT Article 
XXIV:5. Under this interpretation, free trade areas such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and a customs union such as the E.U.—the two 
most prominent free trade agreements and customs unions—are permitted to 
exist as exceptions under GATT Article XXIV:5 to the MFN principle contained 
in GATT Article I. The TPP is also permitted to provide favorable treatment in 
all areas of trade, including goods, services, foreign investment, and technology 
trade without extending the same benefits to all other members of the WTO, such 
as China. Extending favorable treatment to TPP members while excluding 
benefits to non-members of the TPP, such as China, is perfectly legal under the 
GATT/WTO. Indeed, as noted earlier, the WTO encourages free trade 
agreements.107 So regardless of any argument that China might make to the 
contrary, the TPP is consistent with the WTO. 
B.  The Effect of Preferentia l Trade Agreements in Creating and 
Diverting Trade 
The effect of excluding China from the TPP is that China, unless it joins, 
will be unable to enjoy the benefits the TPP provides to all of its twelve member 
states. The short-term goal of the TPP is to reduce tariffs among its members 
below their current GATT rates and, in the long term, to eliminate all tariffs in 
order to have a true free trade area.108 As all TPP tariffs are reduced to below 
current GATT rates, members of the TPP enjoy “WTO plus” treatment for their 
goods because imports from TPP countries will enjoy better tariff treatment than 
they would under the WTO.109 The economic effect of this preferential treatment 
                                                 
rules of origin if a good from China enters Mexico and then enters the U.S., the U.S. might treat 
the good as originating from China and impose ordinary tariffs. A customs union, like the E.U., 
also has free movement of goods among all of its members (that is, duty free treatment) but imposes 
a single external tariff on non-members of the E.U. Thus, it makes no difference whether goods 
from China enter the E.U. through Italy, France, Germany, or Belgium; the goods are subject to 
the same tariff, thus eliminating the incentive to forum shop. Of course, a single external tariff 
requires greater economic integration than a free trade area. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 55–56. 
107  See GATT, supra note 87, at art. XXIV:4. 
108  TPP, art. 2.4 entitled “Elimination of Customs Duties” states in relevant part: “Unless otherwise 
provided in this Agreement, each Part shall progressively eliminate its customs duties on originating 
goods in accordance with its Schedule to Annex 2-D (Tariff Commitments).” TPP, supra note 1, at 
art. 2.4(2). 
109  All of the TPP members are also WTO members, which means that they currently maintain WTO 
tariffs. The concept is to reduce the rates to zero under the TPP. Thus, TPP members receive 
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is to increase trade and political cooperation among TPP member states.110 This 
is apparent because imports that are subject to TPP tariffs are less expensive than 
imports that are subject to WTO tariffs. The lower TPP tariffs on goods from 
other TPP countries will be less expensive to the importer, which in turn will pass 
on the savings to the consumer driving up demand for the imports. This will 
result, in the long term, in an increase in trade among TPP members. This is how 
PTAs result in increases in trade among their members. Similar arguments can be 
made for other sectors, such as trade in services, investment, and technology. 
Although each area differs in some ways from the trade in goods, the basic 
concept of preferential treatment is the same—all areas of trade will increase 
between TPP members.111 
What might be less apparent is that preferential trade agreements also divert 
trade (and perhaps political cooperation) from non-members.112 To take a 
concrete example, suppose that after the TPP takes effect, an importer in the U.S. 
has the choice between importing two substantially similar products either from 
China, a non-member of the TPP, or from Vietnam, a TPP member. Assume for 
the purposes of this hypothetical that the U.S. GATT rate for the product is five 
percent for all imports (including imports from China) but that the TPP rate for 
the same product from Vietnam is zero. If the products from China and Vietnam 
                                                 
“WTO plus” treatment. 
110  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 52. 
111  Various governmental and non-governmental sources indicate that the U.S. should see an increase 
in all other areas of trade in addition to the trade in goods. For example, the United States Trade 
Representative believes that the TPP will increase U.S. exports of services. Trans-Pacific Partnership: 
Summary of U.S. Objectives, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://perma.cc/X6YC-CBQ7 (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2016) The Trade Representative has stated: 
Services industries account for four out of five U.S. jobs and also represent a 
significant and growing share of jobs in other TPP countries. Securing 
liberalized and fair access to foreign services markets will help U.S. service 
suppliers, both small and large, seeking to do business in TPP markets, thereby, 
supporting jobs at home. 
Id. The USTR also believes that the TPP will boost U.S. exports of technology (that is, intellectual 
property) intensive goods. Id. (“In TPP, we are working to advance strong, state-of-the-art, and 
balanced rules that will protect and promote U.S. exports of IP-intensive products and services 
throughout the Asia-Pacific region.”). Another institutional study indicates that the TPP will boost 
outward U.S. technology transfer. See Nam D. Pham et al., NDP Analytics, The Economic Benefits of 
Intellectual Property Rights in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 4 (2014). https://perma.cc/T422-8GSQ. Both 
inward foreign investment from other countries and outward U.S. foreign direct investment in other 
countries are expected to rise as a result of the TPP.  Theodore H. Moran & Lindsay Oldenski, TPP 
Will Promote Investment as Well as Trade, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Mar. 10, 2015, 11:15 AM), 
https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/tpp-will-promote-investment-well-trade. 
These benefits are reciprocal, that is, U.S. trading partners should be a similar increase in their 
modes of trade in additional to the trade in goods. 
112  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 52. 
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are similar in quality, a rational importer will choose to import the product from 
Vietnam. 
Under the hypothetical five percent GATT rate tariff, an imported product 
from China with a price of $1 will cost the importer $1.05 with the tariff included 
and the importer will then pass the cost onto the consumer in the form of a 5-
cent increase in price.113 This might seem to be a trivial difference, but it is not. 
Suppose that the importer orders one million units of the product, which would 
not be unusual for any number of items used regularly by consumers, such as 
textiles (clothing). At this point, the GATT tariff on goods from China will cost 
the importer an extra $50,000 dollars to import as opposed to the products 
imported from Vietnam. In every highly competitive industry, even slight cost 
differentials can be decisive. Continuing our hypothetical, assume that the retail 
price of the product is $5; at this price point, the consumer will pay $5 for the 
import from Vietnam but $5.25 for the same product from China. This cost 
difference does not factor in the cost of a sales tax in some states that is usually 
assessed as a percentage of the retail price of the goods, which will further increase 
the price of the import from China. (Assuming a six percent retail tax, the import 
from Vietnam will cost $5.30 whereas the import from China will cost $5.67.) 
Assume further that the items are not sold individually but come in a convenient 
package of ten at the retail level because few consumers are likely to purchase the 
particular item one at a time. The consumer will pay $50 for a package of ten 
products from Vietnam but $55.65 dollars for the same package from China 
(including a six percent sales tax).  
Over time, what will occur? As rational economic actors, importers and 
consumers will prefer to buy the imports from Vietnam, and the imports from 
China will go unsold. As a result, the importer will stop importing goods from 
China and import them from Vietnam instead. If we generalize this example to 
goods across many sectors, including high technology goods, the U.S. might be 
able to source goods across many industries from TPP countries instead of from 
China. Recall that Japan and Australia are also members of the TPP and other 
countries, such as South Korea, have indicated that they wish to join. This could 
give the U.S. many sources of goods comparable to Chinese goods in all areas, 
including high technology areas (for example, auto parts) but at a lower price 
because of the preferential tariff for TPP members. If China does not join the 
                                                 
113  The importer, usually a distributor, pays the increased tariff in order to clear the goods at customs 
so that they will be allowed to enter the internal market. What prevents the importer from absorbing 
the price increase and not passing on the price increase onto the consumer in the form of higher 
retail prices? The answer is nothing. If the importer does not pass on the increased tariff to the 
consumer, then the importer simply earns fewer profits. Most importers, however, wish to 
maximize profits and so for this reason higher tariffs usually mean higher prices for consumers. 
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TPP, China’s trade with the U.S. and other TPP members will be diverted to other 
TPP countries and China could suffer a loss in trade opportunities.114 
C. The Political Benefits of Diverting Trade from China  
Diverting trade away from China serves important U.S. interests at the 
present because of the heated political criticism and vehement populist anger over 
the ever-mushrooming trade deficit with China, which reached a record $365.7 
billion in 2015. 115 The breakdown of this figure indicates that in 2015, the U.S. 
sold $116.2 billion in exported goods to China while purchasing $481.9 billion of 
imports from China.116 To place the trade deficit with China in historical 
perspective, in one year from 2014-2015, the U.S. trade deficit grew by almost $30 
billion, a 6.6% increase.117 In 1985, the U.S. trade deficit with China was $6 
million;118 the 2015 figure represents a growth of over 60,000 times in three 
decades. The U.S. trade deficit with China is much larger (by $230 billion) than 
the combined trade deficits of the next four largest U.S. trade deficits with a single 
country: Germany ($74 billion), Japan ($68 billion), Mexico ($58 billion), and 
Vietnam ($30 billion).119 The U.S. trade deficit with China is nearly five times that 
of the U.S. trade deficit with Germany. 
The negative consequences of the U.S. trade deficit with China can be 
understood through reviewing some basic international economic principles. 
When a nation experiences a trade deficit, it is buying more goods from its trading 
partner than it is selling.120  In other words, a nation with a trade deficit is spending 
more than it is earning from international trade.121 In the case of the U.S., it is 
spending $365.7 billion more than it is earning from the trade with China, and 
China is becoming wealthier by $365.7 billion per year in its trade with the U.S., 
with the gap widening with every year. The long-term consequences for a nation 
with a continuing trade deficit are that unless other growth factors are present (for 
                                                 
114  From a macroeconomic perspective, the balance between trade increases and trade diversion due 
to free trade areas is the most important question for the multilateral trading system. To the extent 
that trade increases outweigh trade diversion, the entire multilateral trading system is better off even 
if some countries lose trade opportunities. To the extent that losses from trade diversion outweigh 
trade increases, the preferential trade agreement then becomes a net loss for the multilateral trading 
system. 
115  See Terence P. Jeffrey, $365,694,500,000: U.S. Merchandise Trade Deficit With China Hit Record in 2015, 
CNS NEWS, (Feb. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/2LDT-ADRY. 
116  See id. 
117  See id. 
118  See id. 
119  See id. 
120  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 30. 
121  See id. 
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example, the sale of services, innovation in technology, the influx of capital 
through investment from foreign countries) the nation’s economy begins to shrink 
and may become mired in debt.122 
On the other hand, the nation enjoying the trade surplus will become flush 
with cash from revenues earned from trade, its economy will grow quickly and, in 
the case of China, become a global trading power.123 China could use its earnings 
to buy more goods from the U.S. and reciprocate in the trade in goods, but China 
has chosen not to do so.124 In China’s case, China is “hoarding”125 by choosing to 
save instead of spend its earnings.126 China saves its earnings by using those 
earnings from selling goods to the U.S. to buy more and more of the U.S. economy 
in the form of U.S. government securities, such as treasury bonds.127 The debtor 
nation is trapped in a never ending cycle of an escalating trade deficit and 
increasing debt.128 This is true for the U.S. as China is lending money to the U.S. 
by buying U.S. debt instruments (in other words, U.S. treasury bonds that pay 
interest to China and must pay the principal by a specific due date unless they are 
renewed).129 The extra cash that the U.S. has available by borrowing from China 
means that the U.S. does not have to raise revenue through other more painful 
means such as increasing taxes on consumers or cut spending on government 
services.130 The money loaned from China results in more consumer disposable 
income that is being used by U.S. consumers to buy more cheap goods from 
China, leading to an increase in the trade deficit.131 The U.S. then needs to borrow 
even more (that is, sells more treasury bonds to China) to maintain its increasing 
levels of consumption and spending on government services. The U.S. seems 
trapped in a cycle of a spiraling trade deficit and increasing debt with China gaining 
more and more economic power over the U.S.132 One way to deal with this cycle, 
that is, to reduce the trade deficit, is to buy fewer goods from China and to buy 
the same goods from another source, such as other countries in the TPP. This will 
allow the U.S. to reduce the trade deficit with China and still at the same time 
                                                 
122  See id. 
123  See id. 
124  See id. at 45. 
125  This is a term used by critics of China. See id. at 46. 
126  See id. at 45. 
127  See id. at 45–46. 
128  See id. at 47. 
129  See id. at 46–48. 
130  See id. at 47. 
131  See id. 
132  See id. 
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maintain or increase its level of consumption in order to satisfy consumer demand 
and avoid painful austerity measures. 
A related hot-button issue that stems from the trade deficit in goods with 
China is that some U.S. companies are moving their operations overseas.133 
Chinese goods are popular with U.S. consumers due to their quality and low 
cost.134 Some U.S. companies are responding by moving their manufacturing 
operations to China in order to take advantage of the low cost of labor and other 
lower costs in manufacturing.135 These U.S. companies manufacture goods in 
China and then export them to the U.S.136 However, the movement of 
manufacturing operations from the U.S. to China means that jobs in the U.S. are 
being lost and replaced by jobs created in China.137 This is what is commonly 
referred to as “outsourcing,” a disliked and politically charged term that seems to 
immediately incite boiling anger and resentment in many people in the United 
States.138 These negative sentiments towards China are exacerbated by arguments 
expressed by some politicians that the advantages enjoyed by China are not the 
result of greater efficiencies but by cheating through currency manipulation and 
low standards in labor, among other practices.139 
The virtue of the TPP is that trade will be diverted from China to other TPP 
countries, reducing the trade deficit with China and the outsourcing of jobs to 
China that so enrages some U.S. politicians and workers. The TPP countries will 
need to abide by the high standards set forth in the TPP so they cannot “cheat” 
in their trade with the U.S. as China currently does, according to China’s critics.140 
While the TPP could result in the diversion of trade from China to the U.S., 
the same holds true for all members of the TPP. The same arguments made earlier 
in this section apply to other TPP countries as well. All TPP members, such as 
Australia and Japan, now have an economic incentive in the form of lower tariffs 
to buy goods from other TPP members instead of from China. Exclusion from 
                                                 
133  See Katherine Peralta, Outsourcing to China Cost 3.2 Million Jobs Since 2001, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, (Dec. 11, 2014), https://perma.cc/4BTD-KHL9. 
134  See Mark Huffman, Why Cheap Chinese Products Are About to Get Cheaper, CONSUMER AFFAIRS (Aug. 
11, 2015), https://perma.cc/K7W5-LDXE. 
135  See Kimberly Amadeo, How Outsourcing Jobs Affects the U.S. Economy, THE BALANCE, (June 25, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/W7UQ-9ZGH. 
136  See id. 
137  See HUFFMAN, supra note 134. 
138  Michael Snyder, Why Are the American People Mad? Maybe It is Because Millions of Their Jobs Have Been 
Lost to Outsourcing and They Aren’t Coming Back, END OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (July 29, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/5YCL-2NHG.  
139  See Daniel Mills, China Cheats While the U.S. Suffers, ECONOMY IN CRISIS (May 25, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/2PEQ-AHPV. 
140  See id. 
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the TPP means losses of trade opportunities for China, not only with the U.S., 
but also with the entire membership of the TPP, which currently accounts for 
forty percent of world trade.141 This creates a serious dilemma for China. 
III.  HOW JOINING THE TPP  WILL NEUTRALIZE MAJOR TRADE 
ADVANTAGES CHINA CURRENTLY ENJOYS  
One alternative for China is to join the TPP and enjoy the advantages of 
lower tariffs and increased trade with the members of the TPP. This might seem 
to be an obvious step but here is where the U.S. strategy has created the other 
prong in the dilemma for China. In order to join the TPP, China must agree to 
the terms of the TPP, as well as any other terms that the U.S. Congress might 
demand as a price of admission to the TPP. China would also have to undergo a 
humiliating process of approval of its TPP entry by the U.S. Congress, which 
might relish an opportunity to criticize and humiliate China.142 While it is unclear 
what demands Congress might place on China, a reading of the TPP illustrates 
how several key provisions are meant specifically to neutralize the advantages that 
China currently enjoys outside of the TPP.143 Compliance with the terms of the 
TPP and other demands by Congress is the price of admission for China to get 
access to the preferential treatment reserved to TPP members. 
A.  Workers’  Rights Under the TPP 
One of China’s major advantages in trade that the U.S. sought to neutralize 
is China’s comparatively low cost of labor.144 The average cost of manual labor in 
China is less than $1 per hour while the average cost in the U.S. is nearly $20 per 
hour.145 China’s low labor costs lead directly to less expensive goods—a key appeal 
to the U.S. consumer and also a key factor in the growing U.S. trade deficit with 
China. Critics argue that China’s low labor costs are made possible by a disregard 
                                                 
141  See HOWARD, supra note 3. 
142  See supra note 15. 
143  There are a number of hot button issues on which Congress might seek concessions from China. 
For example, Congress might demand that China show greater respect for intellectual property 
rights by cracking down on trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy, a major source of 
contention between the U.S. and China and that China put a stop to its currency manipulation that 
increases the U.S. trade deficit. For a discussion of counterfeiting, see DANIEL C.K. CHOW & 
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 537–53 (3d ed. 2015). For a discussion of China’s currency manipulation, see Daniel 
C.K. Chow, Can the United States Impose Trade Sanctions on China for Currency Manipulation?, 16 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript on file with the author).  
144  See M. Dana Baldwin, Addressing the Challenge of China’s Labor Cost Advantages, CENTER FOR 
SIMPLIFIED STRATEGIC  PLANNING, INC. (2016), https://perma.cc/K4M3-B5VK. 
145  See id. 
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for workers’ rights, subjecting workers to intolerable and dangerous working 
conditions, long hours, and forms of coerced or forced labor.146 
The following provisions of the TPP related to workers’ rights were likely 
also drafted by the U.S. with China in mind as the main target.147 Article 19.3 of 
the TPP provides: 
1. Each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statues and regulations, and 
practices thereunder the following rights as stated in the ILO [International 
Labor Organization] Declaration: (a) freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of all 
forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child 
labour and . . . a prohibition on the worst forms of child labour; and (d) the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.148 
The reference to the standards of the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), contained in TPP Article 19.3, can be best understood in the context of 
the long debate about including labor rights in the WTO culminating in the 
declaration issued by the first WTO Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in 
December 1996.149 At the time, a debate raged in the WTO on whether to 
introduce human rights in the GATT and WTO.150 Although many attempts were 
made, none succeeded, due to the controversial nature of the subject of human 
rights.151 The Singapore Ministerial Declaration ended the controversy once and 
for all by declaring that the ILO is the competent body to deal with labor 
standards.152 The result of this decision is that workers’ rights are outside the 
purview of the WTO and within the jurisdiction of the ILO.153 
The most important consequence of the Singapore Declaration with relation 
to workers’ rights is that the breach of workers’ rights cannot be used to justify a 
trade restriction under the WTO.154 Rather, the complaining nation must assert its 
claims within the ILO.155 However, the ILO is a toothless organization with no 
                                                 
146  See David Barboza, In Chinese Factories, Lost Fingers and Low Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/business/worldbusiness/05sweatshop.html. 
147  See Kelsey, supra note 17 (noting that every major proposal in the TPP is targeted at China). The 
U.S. considers labor rights and trade to be an important trade issue as evidence by the inclusion of 
provisions connecting labor and trade in every recent U.S. free trade agreement. See infra Section 
IV. 
148  TPP, supra note 1, at art. 19.3(1). 
149  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 369. 
150  See id. 
151  See id. 
152  See id. 
153  See id. at 370. 
154  See id. 
155  See id. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 392 Vol. 17 No. 2 
real enforcement power.156 Limiting recourse to the ILO means that breaches of 
workers’ rights in international trade are effectively unenforceable and will go 
unpunished. The significance of incorporating the ILO’s basic principles within 
the TPP is that the ILO principles become TPP legal obligations that are now 
subject to the TPP’s dispute settlement system. This means that a TPP member 
may be authorized to impose trade sanctions on another TPP member for breach 
of workers’ rights, now giving teeth to the ILO’s principles.157 The TPP brings the 
ILO’s principles within an international legal regime with effective enforcement 
powers. 
The TPP also adds two other significant provisions regarding workers’ 
rights. Article 19.3(2) states: “[e]ach Party shall adopt and maintain statutes and 
regulations, and practices thereunder, governing acceptable conditions of work 
with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and 
health.”158 Article 19.5(1) states: “No Party shall fail to effectively enforce its 
labour laws through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction in a 
manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties after the date of entry 
into force of this Agreement.”159 The major significance of these two provisions 
is that they bring domestic labor laws and regulations within the purview of the 
TPP and its enforcement mechanism. Like many countries, China has effective 
labor laws on its books,160 but, according to critics, China fails to enforce these 
laws in practice.161 Currently, the failure to enforce labor laws within China is 
subject to recourse within the ILO, an illusory remedy, or within China’s own 
domestic legal system. Within China’s domestic legal system, the complaining 
party lacks any recourse if China’s own internal domestic systems fail to enforce 
its labor laws, a common problem due to a number of systemic weaknesses.162 
Under the TPP, however, the failure of a TPP country to enforce its own labor 
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laws now becomes a violation of the TPP and subject to the TPP’s dispute 
settlement mechanism. 
The consequence of the TPP’s labor provisions is that once China joins the 
TPP, China will no longer be able to maintain factories that are dangerous and 
unsanitary.163 Chinese factories can no longer require workers to toil through 
onerous and unreasonable hours, or subject persons to forms of labor that could 
be deemed to be coercive.164 If China does not abide by the TPP standards, the 
U.S. can challenge China through the TPP dispute settlement system, with trade 
sanctions as a possible option. Currently, the U.S. and U.S.-based multinational 
corporations (MNCs) lack the ability to challenge China’s workers’ rights record 
in any forum other than the ILO or China’s own legal system, a mechanism that 
is not viewed as independent or impartial.165 
From a competitive standpoint, meeting the TPP’s high labor standards 
should result in an increase in labor costs and a corresponding increase in the price 
of imports from China. The labor provisions of the TPP were designed by the 
U.S. to neutralize one of China’s major advantages in trade—highly skilled and 
conscientious but inexpensive manual labor created by substandard working 
conditions. 
B.  Environmental Obligations Under the TPP 
The TPP incorporates a number of environmental provisions that are not 
available under the WTO. In the WTO, environmental concerns are linked to 
trade but only in an indirect and peripheral way by decisions of the WTO 
Appellate Body, which functions as a high court of international trade.166 By 
contrast, the TPP explicitly ties environmental concerns to the trade in goods (as 
well as in the other channels of trade) in the text of the TPP agreement itself. 
The extensive environmental obligations under the TPP are the subject of 
Article 20, with no parallel in the texts of the WTO. Most salient to the main 
themes of this work is Article 20.5, Protection of the Ozone Layer, which 
provides: 
1. The Parties recognise that emissions of certain substances can significantly 
deplete and otherwise modify the ozone layer in a manner that is likely to 
result in adverse effects on human health and the environment. Accordingly, 
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each Party shall take measures to control the production and consumption 
of, and trade in, such substances.167 
This TPP provision was likely drafted by the U.S. with the specific purpose 
of reining in China. Why? China is the leading producer of greenhouse gases that 
directly damage the atmosphere’s ozone layer.168 In other words, China poses the 
world’s single greatest threat to the destruction of the ozone layer, and the key 
objective of TPP Article 20.5 is the protection of the ozone layer. Ozone depletion 
leads to global warming that could cause permanent and serious damage to the 
environment.169 China continues to use a glut of coal-fired power plants—a source 
of greenhouse gases—as part of its plan of national development.170 Not only does 
China’s use of so-called “dirty fuel” harm the environment, but these fuel sources 
create a competitive advantage. China uses coal-fired power plants because these 
plants are a cheaper source of energy than other forms that are environmentally 
sustainable. In the U.S., the use of coal-fired power plants has been replaced in 
part by different alternatives such as gas, solar, and wind power, but these 
technologies are generally much more expensive than coal.171 Using cheap sources 
of energy, such as coal-fired power plants, leads to lower prices for goods 
produced in such plants and gives China an advantage in its exports. TPP Article 
20.5 imposes a mandatory duty to protect the ozone layer through controlling the 
production of greenhouse gases (parties “shall take measures” to control ozone 
depleting substances). 
Article 20.5 is only one example of many provisions in Chapter 20 that create 
greater obligations concerning environmental obligations. Other TPP provisions 
require protection of the marine environment from ship pollution,172 the adoption 
of corporate social responsibility policies by companies operating domestically 
with respect to the environment,173 the management of fisheries such that fishing 
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does not lead to overconsumption of fish species,174 and the control of the illegal 
trade in certain endangered fauna and flora.175 All of these provisions will involve 
additional environmental responsibilities (and costs) for China at the international 
level, but this discussion has focused on Article 20.5 because it is intended to have 
the most immediate and serious impact on China in the area of environmental 
sustainability if China chooses to join the TPP. 
Aside from the environmental benefits created by the TPP, and more 
germane to the thesis in this Article,176 joining the TPP would also dull China’s 
competitive advantages in manufacturing of inexpensive goods. To be consistent 
with the TPP, China might have to abandon or limit the use of coal-fired power 
plants and use alternative and more expensive, but environmentally friendly, 
sources of power instead. Use of these more expensive alternative technologies 
will increase the cost of producing goods in Chinese factories and neutralize a 
major advantage that China currently enjoys in trade—cheap goods due to 
production methods using outdated and highly polluting technologies. 
C. Restrictions on China’s Support of State -Owned Enterprises  
A third set of provisions in the TPP takes direct aim at China’s SOEs that 
receive many forms of financial and non-financial assistance from the State. In its 
2015 annual report to Congress, the U.S. Trade Representative stated: 
Many of the problems that arise in the U.S.-China trade and investment 
relationship can be traced to . . . the large role of state-owned enterprises and 
other national champions in China’s economy, which continue to generate 
significant trade distortions that inevitably give rise to trade frictions.177 
An SOE is a business enterprise that is an administrative unit of the State.178 
The State owns the SOE as opposed to ownership by a private person or group 
of persons.179 China has a web of national policies to “incessantly strengthen” the 
“vitality”180 of SOEs, considering them to be ingrained in the “lifeline of the 
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economy.”181 China’s plan is to create SOEs that are “national champions” that 
can dominate international trade.182 Reflecting the importance of SOEs in China, 
all of the vital sectors of China’s economy are controlled by SOEs that have 
monopolies in energy, transportation (including air and rail transport), banking, 
electricity, water supply, and telecommunications.183 Recently, China reported the 
existence of 144,700 SOEs, excluding banks, with total assets worth $13.6 
trillion.184 The world’s largest company by capitalization is Petro-China,185 an SOE 
that ranks ahead of Exxon-Mobil on the 2015 Fortune 500 list.186 China has three 
SOEs among the top ten largest companies in the world.187 While other TPP 
countries also have SOEs, China’s SOEs are unique in the role they play in China’s 
economy, their size and financial strength, and the power they wield in China’s 
economy. The importance of SOEs to China’s national interests means that the 
State provides support to SOEs in myriad forms. This state assistance to SOEs 
comes at the expense of MNCs with operations in China.188 
MNCs doing business in China often claim that the Chinese government 
discriminates against them in favor of SOEs through three common practices. 
First, SOEs often prefer purchasing goods and service from other SOEs rather 
than MNCs.189 Purchasing agents might prefer to purchase goods from sources 
they have dealt with in the past or from sales agents in other SOEs with which 
they have personal or professional relationships.190 A more nefarious possibility is 
that purchasing agents working in SOEs may receive a kickback (as in, a bribe) 
from the sales agent of SOE that sells the product.191 
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Second, MNCs claim that the Chinese government discriminates against 
MNCs under important regulatory regimes, such as the Anti-Monopoly Law 
(AML) and under various anti-bribery laws.192 For example, MNCs argue that 
Chinese authorities apply the AML to benefit SOEs by blocking acquisitions of 
Chinese companies by MNCs or by imposing onerous conditions on MNCs such 
as requiring the sale of assets to SOEs in order to approve a merger or acquisition 
by an MNC of a Chinese company.193 Chinese authorities use the AML to impose 
or threaten to impose heavy fines in order to force MNCs to reduce prices on 
their products while not subjecting SOEs to these pressures.194 MNCs also argue 
that Chinese authorities are cracking down on MNCs under anti-bribery laws 
while ignoring similar conduct by SOEs.195 Recently, Chinese authorities imposed 
a record $500 million fine on GlaxoSmithKline for bribing Chinese doctors and 
hospitals to prescribe its medications.196 MNCs note that this record fine was 
imposed on an MNC while SOEs that engage in far more egregious conduct go 
unpunished.197 
A third common complaint is that China provides subsidies (financial 
contributions) to SOEs, a form of financial assistance.198 The effect of a subsidy 
is that it lowers the operating costs of SOEs, providing a competitive advantage 
over MNCs in China. Subsidies to SOEs also provide a competitive price 
advantage by lowering the cost of the products when they are exported into the 
U.S. The lower price of Chinese goods provides them a competitive advantage 
over competing U.S. products. 
The WTO has provisions that prohibit discrimination in the purchase of 
goods,199 discrimination in the application of internal regulations,200 and the 
provision of subsidies.201 The WTO provisions, however, are general in nature 
applying to all forms of discrimination and subsidies, whereas the TPP provisions 
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were drafted specifically with SOEs in mind and directly target illegal conduct by 
SOEs. The TPP provisions are designed to facilitate enforcement of specific 
obligations against SOEs. 
The TPP addresses all three of these concerns raised by U.S.-based MNCs. 
Article 17.4 of the TPP requires SOEs to avoid discrimination in the purchase of 
goods and services by giving treatment to goods and services from other TPP 
parties treatment no less favorable than that accorded to SOEs.202 Article 17.5 of 
the TPP prohibits discrimination in favor of SOEs in the exercise of regulatory 
authority.203 Article 17.6 prohibits the use of “non-commercial assistance” to any 
SOEs related to the production of goods or the supply of services. As the context 
of Article 17.6 set forth below indicates, non-commercial assistance refers to 
assistance that is not available in the marketplace but is provided only by a 
government. In this context, assistance refers to: 
i. direct transfers of funds or potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities, 
such as: A. grants or debt forgiveness; B. loans, loan guarantees or other types 
of financing on terms more favourable than commercially available to that 
enterprise; or C. equity capital inconsistent with the usual investment practice, 
including for the provision of risk capital, of private investors[  ] (ii) goods or 
services other than general infrastructure on terms more favourable than 
those commercially available to that enterprise.204 
A comparison of this provision with the provisions in the WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) indicates that the quoted text 
of the TPP set forth above closely tracks SCM Article 1, which defines a “subsidy” 
for the purpose of imposing a countervailing duty as an extra tariff imposed by 
the importing country on a subsidized import to offset the effect of the subsidy.205 
TPP Article 17.6 is specifically aimed at subsidies provided by China to SOEs 
whereas the SCM deals with government subsidies provided to all types of private 
businesses. The TPP is aimed directly at the type of subsidies that China is 
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frequently accused of providing to its SOEs.206 The direct consequence of Article 
17.6 is that it provides the U.S. with clear authority to impose countervailing duties 
on subsidized imports from SOEs, neutralizing a major advantage that SOEs have 
in international trade. The imposition of the countervailing duty will reduce the 
demand for the imports by increasing their prices (as the importer passes on the 
increase to the consumer) and will make U.S. products more competitive relative 
to the now more expensive import. China will then be forced to either accept a 
reduced demand that leads to fewer imports or remove the subsidy. 
Due to the outsized role that SOEs enjoy in China and in global trade, these 
provisions of the TPP were also likely drafted with China as the target. No other 
current TPP country has SOEs that approach the size and power of China’s SOEs 
or their dominance in international trade. Joining the TPP will make China’s most 
frequently complained of practices that benefit SOEs illegal and will allow the U.S. 
to directly challenge these practices in the TPP dispute settlement system. 
IV.  THE U.S ’S GOAL TO BE THE FINAL ARBITER OF THE 
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE  
The negotiation process for the TPP, which proceeded without input from 
China, may become a model for how the U.S. negotiates multilateral treaties in 
the future. If this appears to be an aggressive tactic by the U.S. to control a rival, 
this is exactly the intent. Discussing the TPP on May 2, 2016, President Obama 
stated: 
[The TPP] would give us a leg up on our economic competitors, including . . . 
China. Of course, China’s greatest economic opportunities also lie in its own 
neighborhood, which is why China is not wasting any time. As we speak, 
China is negotiating a trade deal that would carve up some of the fastest-
growing markets in the world at our expense, putting American jobs, business 
and goods at risk. . . . America should write the rules. America should call the 
shots. Other countries should play by the rules that America and our partners 
set, not the other way around. . . . The United States, not . . . China, should 
write them.”207 
Attempts by the U.S. to control China have not, of course, escaped China’s 
notice, and they underscore how the relationship between the two countries has 
increasingly become a fierce rivalry. The U.S. and China take starkly different 
approaches to international trade treaties, which benefit the interests of each 
country. 
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The recent approach of the U.S. in all of its international trade treaties is to 
link social issues such as workers’ rights and the environment to trade. This 
practice began with the North American Free Trade Agreement, which came into 
effect in 1994.208 As part of NAFTA, the parties also entered into two side 
agreements: the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, which 
includes provisions linking trade to workers’ rights,209 and the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, which includes obligations linking 
trade to the environment.210 In 2011, the U.S. ratified the U.S. Korea Free Trade 
Agreement (KORUS).211 KORUS includes a reciprocal obligation to adopt the 
four basic principles of the ILO similar to the obligation created by TPP Article 
19.3.212 The State Department’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, which serves 
as a template for all future U.S. investment treaties, also contains provisions 
related to workers’ rights and the environment as well as provisions on 
transparency in government.213 These developments indicate that the U.S. will link 
workers’ rights and environmental issues to trade in all future trade agreements. 
None of these U.S. agreements contain any special provisions relating to SOEs, 
another indication that the SOE chapter in the TPP was aimed directly at China. 
By contrast, China’s trade agreements reveal a different approach. China has 
entered into recent bilateral free trade agreements with its partners, including 
Costa Rica (2011), Pakistan (2009), Peru (2009), Singapore (2009), New Zealand 
(2008), and Chile (2006).214 On November 22, 2015, China signed a Protocol to 
enhance the China Free Trade Agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (consisting of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (collectively ASEAN)).215 China is 
also negotiating the One Belt One Road agreements (so named after the historic 
Silk Road used in ancient times to trade with Europe) that will create unblocked 
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road and rail access from China to sixty European countries.216 China has many 
more free trade agreements that are being negotiated. The hallmark of all of these 
agreements is that they contain no provisions linking trade to workers’ rights and 
the environment. China’s agreements also contain no provisions that limit the 
trading rights of SOEs. 
These two contrasting approaches concerning the linkage of social issues to 
trade reflect a fundamental difference in philosophy in the use of trade to create 
sticks and carrots on social issues and is a topic that is beyond the scope of this 
Article.217 This Article has focused on the trade and economic effects of such 
provisions. From this perspective, linking trade to workers’ rights and the 
environment increases the costs of trade and is intended to neutralize the 
competitive advantages (that is, lower prices) that China now currently enjoys in 
international trade. According to the U.S. government, the TPP “level[s] the 
playing field for American workers and American businesses . . . [and] will help 
increase Made-in-America exports, grow the American economy, [and] support 
well-paying American jobs.”218 
V.  CONCLUSION  
The U.S.’s attempt to contain China in international trade through the TPP 
has left China with a dilemma: it can ignore the TPP and risk losses in trade 
opportunities, or submit to the TPP and the humiliating process of applying to 
the U.S. Congress to join the TPP. 219 In the author’s view, China is not likely to 
join the TPP, to surrender itself to a humiliating defeat in international trade, and 
to acknowledge that China has been outsmarted by the U.S. The other alternative, 
losing international trade opportunities with nations that account for forty percent 
of global trade,220 also does not seem acceptable. What will China do? 
China may choose a third alternative—negotiate its own multilateral 
preferential trade agreements on its own terms with its trading partners in Asia 
and outside of Asia that will exclude the U.S. Indeed, China is now negotiating a 
rival preferential trade agreement in Asia called the Regional Comprehensive 
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Economic Partnership (Regional Partnership).221 By some measures, the Regional 
Partnership is more impressive than the TPP because the Regional Partnership 
covers nearly half the world’s population and four times the number of workers 
and consumers covered by the TPP.222 A major difference between the two is that 
the Regional Partnership includes China—the world’s most populous nation—
and India—the world’s second most populous nation and a growing economic 
power in its own right—while the TPP does not.223 Countries that wish to preserve 
a good relationship with both the U.S. and China have joined both the TPP and 
the Regional Partnership with seven countries overlapping between the two 
agreements.224 This overlapping membership will reduce the diversionary trade 
effect of the TPP if China chooses not to join, because these countries will still 
purchase Chinese goods, as these goods will still receive “WTO plus” treatment 
under the Regional Partnership, not the TPP. Just as China was excluded from the 
TPP negotiations, the U.S. was not invited to the negotiations for the Regional 
Partnership.225 In addition to the Regional Partnership, China will undoubtedly 
continue to negotiate individual free trade agreements with countries that will not 
contain any of the provisions concerning workers’ rights, the environment, and 
SOEs used by the U.S. to contain China. 
These recent developments in the negotiation of trade agreements 
underscore more clearly than ever that the U.S. and China see themselves as rivals, 
not allies, in world trade. Given their contrasting approaches to international 
trade, who writes the rules of international trade becomes paramount in the 
rivalry. The U.S. will seek to neutralize China’s cost advantages in international 
trade in all of its trade treaties and China will seek to preserve them in its trade 
treaties. No one should be surprised at this result. It is a political reality that 
nations enter into trade agreements that are in their best interests at the expense 
of rivals. The U.S. has entered into trade agreements that promote its best interests 
at the expense of China, and China has done the same at the expense of the U.S. 
This Article is a study of how the TPP promotes U.S. interests at the expense of 
China. 
At this moment in history, whether the U.S. or China will write the rules of 
international trade is an open question. What is not open to question is that the 
stakes are high: the nation that writes the rules will likely gain supremacy in 
international trade and will become the leading power in global trade in the 
twenty-first century. 
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